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Abstract
The December 2013 violent conf lict in South Sudan, the world’s newest 
and most fragile state, has shown that a state-building trajectory that only 
emphasises formal institutional development is not viable. Like any state at 
its formative stage, formal institutions in South Sudan have demonstrated 
limited capacity to meet the high demands by citizens for ‘peace or post-
secession’ dividends. The state’s limited capacity has further been eroded 
by political constructs claiming ethnic supremacy by both the Dinka and 
Nuer, the main parties to the December 2013 conf lict. This article argues 
that the entitlement tied to post-secession dividends claims by the Dinka 
and Nuer has (re)produced a generally volatile social space for South Sudan 
by defining the mode of political settlement of the state, and undermining 
the generation of social capital for conf lict management in the society. By 
constructing a nexus between state-building and social capital, this article 
shows that the state-building process in South Sudan requires the hybridity 
of formal and informal institutions. This helps in transforming the volatile 
social space created through the supremacy constructs of the Dinka and 
Nuer and high citizen demands placed on the fragile state.
Keywords: State-building, social capital, ethnic supremacy, Dinka, Nuer, 
South Sudan
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South Sudan is officially the most fragile state in the world according to the 
Fragile States Index 2014. The newest state in the world was indeed poised 
for significant political problems right from the onset. The deadly conf lict 
that began on 15 December 2013 in the country has killed thousands of 
people and displaced more than 1 500 000, with significant humanitarian 
consequences. The violence that has threatened the very existence of the 
barely three year-old independent state is only the height of the political 
difficulties that South Sudan has experienced, even before its inception 
as a formal state. Under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Authority 
on Development (IGAD), the Compromise Agreement on the Resolution 
of the Conf lict in South Sudan was signed on 26 August 2015 between the 
Government of South Sudan (GoSS) and the Sudan People’s Liberation 
Movement/Army-In Opposition (SPLM/A-IO), the main parties to the 
conf lict. As of 12 November 2015, both parties had violated the Permanent 
Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements (IGAD 2015), signifying 
a difficult pathway to political order in South Sudan. 
Whilst current literature on the conf lict has mostly focused on elite politics 
and the ethnic dimensions (De Waal 2014; International Crisis Group 2014; 
Pinaud 2014), it is important to transcend these analyses by examining the 
mode of political settlement that the state-building process has produced. 
This enables us to understand the levels of vulnerability of the communities 
in South Sudan, which, as we shall later see in this article, have made 
it easier to mobilise people for violence rather than for the adoption of 
peaceful ‘coping’ mechanisms for survival. Luka Biong Deng (2010), Ann 
Laudati (2011) and Clémence Pinaud (2014) offer useful insight on how 
large elements of social capital in South Sudan were dismantled while 
other forms of social capital were created during the civil war. However, 
their analyses fail to show how social capital can constitute an important 
element of state-building, and how the process of state-building itself, can 
in fact become detrimental to social capital development.
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The state-building trajectory embraced by South Sudan has emphasised the 
development of the formal institutional capacity of the state, which takes 
a long time to respond to the basic needs of the citizens. In this article, 
the concept of state-building is drawn from Richard Caplan (2004:53) who 
defines it as ‘a set of actions undertaken by actors, whether national or 
international, to establish, reform and strengthen state institutions where 
these have been eroded or are missing’. South Sudan had a semblance 
of these institutions during the six-year transition period stipulated by 
the Compressive Peace Agreement (CPA), spearheaded by IGAD, that 
was reached on 9 January 2005. This ended the 1983–2005 civil war that 
had pitted the Government of Sudan (GoS) against the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A)1. At independence in July 2011 the 
institutions inherited were embryonic and understandably weak in light of 
the long civil war.
Paradoxically, the very process of strengthening the weak institutions 
in South Sudan has in itself become a vehicle for the depletion of social 
capital, which is a key ingredient for state-building and sustainable peace. 
Social capital is the instantiated informal norm that promotes cooperation 
in a society based on embedded trust (Fukuyama 2001:7). It forms an 
important element in promoting cohesion in society by mobilising people 
towards the achievement of collective ends, hence complementing the 
formal institutional goals of the state (Colletta and Cullen 2000; Sawyer 
2005; World Bank 2011).
This article contends that the ideological constructs of ethnic supremacy 
by the Dinka and Nuer ethnic groups have defined the mode of political 
settlement in South Sudan through state capture. These constructs of 
supremacy have been mobilised to sustain claims for post-secession 
dividends, thereby undermining the generation of social capital for 
conf lict management in the society. By constructing a nexus between state-
building and social capital, the article shows that the state-building process 
1 SPLM was the political wing of the rebel movement while SPLA was the military wing. 
Upon signing of the CPA, SPLM transformed to a political party while the SPLA became 
the official army of South Sudan.
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in South Sudan requires the hybridity of formal and informal institutions. 
This helps in transforming the volatile social space created through the 
supremacy constructs of the Dinka and Nuer and the high demands placed 
by citizens on the fragile state.
After this introduction, the next section of this article builds a theoretical 
link between state-building and social capital within the prism of conf lict 
management in society. The article then reviews the emergence of the 
state of South Sudan and the December 2013 conf lict and demonstrates 
the weakness of the state-building strategy. From the foregoing, the article 
proceeds with a discussion of how political constructs by both Dinka and 
Nuer that justify ethnic supremacy have cultivated a form of socio-political 
dominance. This has contributed to the depletion of social capital and the 
creation of volatile social spaces within society. This discussion is followed 
by a section that suggests revisiting the current state-building strategy by 
integrating social capital, and then a conclusion.
The nexus between state-building and social capital
State-building has increasingly become a focus of international 
development discourse in a diametric departure from the past where an 
anti-statist stance occupied the development paradigm as embodied by 
the Washington Consensus. The proliferation of intra-state conf licts 
in developing countries with the attendant regionalised externalities, 
particularly during the first decade of the post-cold war era (Marshall and 
Gurr 2005), led to the perceived need to shift the focus to building states 
which are resilient to the deadly conf licts that had engulfed a considerable 
number of countries in the past. This is particularly the case for Africa, 
which has experienced numerous intra-state conf licts, more than any other 
continent (Straus 2012:180). 
The conception of the state in this article is drawn from Max Weber who 
defines the state as a human community that (successfully) claims a 
monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory 
(Weber 1946:77). The overarching priority of state-building must therefore 
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be to craft a form of political governance and the articulation of a set of 
political processes or mechanisms through which the state and society 
reconcile their expectations of one another (OECD 2008). Challenging as 
this may be, attaining this objective is important for the endurance of the 
legitimacy of the state. There is a shared understanding that state-building 
is about controlling violence, establishing legitimacy and building capable 
and responsive institutions so as to create or foster a shared sense of the 
public realm (Menocal and Fritz 2007). To make these ends achievable, the 
state must a priori act in relative autonomy in deploying its infrastructural 
power by organising society in the interest of citizens in their generality 
(Mann 1984). The inherent challenge, however, is that most citizens as 
principal recipients of the dividends (mostly social and economic) of state-
building tend to have high expectations of the state especially during the 
aftermath of independence or in the post-conf lict period (Menocal 2011). 
Yet experience has shown that state-building can only realise tangible 
dividends over the long-term, as the process is inevitably conf lict-ridden 
(Menocal 2011). 
The process of reconciling societal expectations and the state’s [lack of] 
capacity to meet these expectations, a process that establishes the nature 
of the political settlement, remains one of the most daunting endeavours 
of any state-building enterprise. Political settlement is the balance or 
distribution of power between contending social groups and social classes, 
on which any state is based (Di John and Putzel 2009; Khan 1995). Even 
though the vision of how the state should be constructed or function is 
often an elitist bargaining process (Di John and Putzel 2009), the necessary 
legitimacy that undergirds state-building can be sustained only if a shared 
understanding on political settlement is not limited to the political class 
but extended to the masses. This presupposes a democratic as opposed 
to a Marxist trajectory of state-building. The Marxist approach to state-
building is defined by its focus on class struggles in which the dominant 
class seeks to sustain its ascendency through state capture (Hellman et 
al. 2000). On the other hand, the democratic track to state-building is 
essentially inclusive, with various constitutive elements of the society 
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taken into account. Failure to forge a shared understanding of how the state 
should function may result in some groups or individuals mobilising their 
own vision of the state-society relationship and being driven to pursue it 
through alternative means, including violence (Zartman 1989). 
While there is agreement that institutions matter because they can mediate 
societal differences and manage conf licts, the existing literature on state-
building offers no consensus on the most suitable institutions to achieve 
this, including in post-conf lict settings (Horowitz 2008; Wolff 2011). 
Understandably, the contextual complexities vary considerably and it 
would be naïve to proffer a one-size-fits-all institutional trajectory for 
building states. State-building (or state formation as the embryonic stage) 
is indeed complex, non-linear and replete with unintended outcomes.  
That said, a major weakness in most policy trajectories on state-building 
is that they tend to emphasise formal institutional development to the 
detriment of informal institutions (Boege et al. 2008). The prominence 
accorded to these formal institutions is due to their presumed substantial 
ability to mediate delicate state-society relationships. Yet the political 
settlement which is at the core of state-building includes not only ‘formal 
institutions adapted or created to manage politics - such as electoral 
processes, parliaments, constitutions and truth commissions, many 
of which may be the direct result of peacebuilding efforts – but also, 
crucially, the often informal and unarticulated political arrangements and 
understandings that underpin a political system’ (Menocal 2011:1721). 
This underscores the importance of social capital in managing conf licts 
in society and the need for it to be taken into account in the creation of a 
sustainable political order. 
Where state capacity is under extreme stress, with a weak grip over the 
monopoly of legitimate use of force within its territory, experience in other 
post-conf lict settings such as Afghanistan, Cambodia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, 
Uganda and Rwanda has shown that social capital can be an important 
resource for conf lict management in society (Colletta and Cullen 2000; 
Sawyer 2005; Sanginga et al. 2007; World Bank 2011). All these empirical 
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cases demonstrate how social capital has been critical in developing coping 
mechanisms for the survival of local people to confront security as well as 
social and economic challenges where state capacity was either diminished 
or absent. Local communities have relied on informal norms of cooperation 
that served useful in building trust across communities by encouraging 
collective action to resolve the exigencies of public life, including those that 
fall within the remit of the state, such as security and education. 
Social capital, as defined by Robert Putnam, James Coleman and Francis 
Fukuyama, offers useful insights in understanding the link between state-
building and social capital. A commonality in these authors’ conception of 
social capital is that trust is epiphenomenal, as it facilitates informal norms 
of cooperation and reciprocity rather than constituting social capital by 
itself. Another main similarity in their definition of social capital is that 
it is situated in social structures in which cooperation between individuals 
or groups takes place. However, whilst Coleman (1998:105) conceives of 
social capital as a public good that therefore would be under-produced by 
private agents, Fukuyama (2001:10) refutes this claim by contending that 
cooperation is necessary to virtually all individuals as a means of achieving 
their selfish ends. As we shall see later in the South Sudan case study, these 
contrasting ideas are both useful as they enable us to understand that 
although social capital can produce positive externalities, it can also be 
mobilised for the narrow goals of a group. For instance, during periods 
of armed conf lict, social capital is often hijacked and mobilised to form 
allegiances within the belligerent parties (Leff 2008). 
Putnam (1993:36) focuses on horizontal relationships in society by 
conceiving of social capital as consisting of ‘features of social organisation, 
such as networks, norms, and trust that facilitate coordination and 
cooperation for mutual benefit’. Drawing from his study on Italy’s 
governmental reforms, Putnam noted that communities with positive 
economic development and effective governments are those supported 
by networks of civil engagement, which foster norms of reciprocity that 
reinforce sentiments of trust within a society. 
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Putnam (2000) further elaborates his conception of social capital by stating 
that social networks can be between homogenous groups, that is bonding, 
or between heterogeneous groups, hence conceived as bridging social 
capital. Both bonding and bridging social capital are important for social 
and economic development and for group survival, due to their potency 
in developing coping mechanisms in times of socio-economic difficulties.
Fukuyama cautions that bonding social capital is amenable to supporting 
vertical patronage systems where social capital can be used to cultivate 
patron-client relationships (Fukuyama 2002) that are inimical to state-
building. In his conception of social capital, Fukuyama contends for a 
‘wider radius of trust’ embedded in networks that transcend a particular 
group (such as one based on kinship ties) in order to have a vibrant civil 
society which is an important ingredient for democracy (Fukuyama 2000). 
Trust, in his view, is a key measure of social capital and is reproduced 
through norms of reciprocity and successful cooperation in networks of 
civic engagement (Fukuyama 2001). Coleman's definition of social capital 
focuses on vertical relationships that are characterised by hierarchy and an 
unequal distribution of power among members (Coleman 1988), echoing 
Fukuyama’s conception that social capital can be beneficial to some and/or 
harmful to others, depending on its characteristics and application. 
Both formal vertical relationships and informal horizontal forms of 
social capital which generate trust embedded in structural relationships 
are critical in political settlement, which is at the heart of state-building. 
However, it is important to note that most of the time there is a paucity of 
generalised trust in formal [vertical] institutions due to the state’s failure 
to meet the demands of its people. Consequently, the tendency to develop 
coping mechanisms for the realisation of social and economic needs tends to 
be more undergirded by informal horizontal relationships between people, 
which over time derive a sense of legitimacy. Boege et al (2008:7) note that, 
‘... on many occasions, therefore, the only way to make state institutions 
work is through utilising informal and other traditional networks. This 
way, the state’s ‘outposts’ are mediated by ‘informal’ indigenous societal 
institutions which follow their own logic and rules within the (incomplete) 
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state structures’. This results in the coexistence of various sources and 
forms of legitimacy, and these may not necessarily reinforce each other, but 
rather compete with or undermine one another (Menocal and Fritz 2007). 
The foregoing shows that laying emphasis on formal institutional choices 
alone is bound to produce unintended outcomes to state-building. This 
may include a decay of the monopoly of the state’s legitimate use of coercive 
force, leading to the unregulated use of force by other actors within the 
state. One of the challenges in South Sudan is the pursuit of formal 
institutional development to the detriment of informal institutions in a 
bid to build a state that satisfies the needs of the society while remaining 
resilient to conf licts. The December 2013 conf lict was therefore a corollary 
of this state-building approach in South Sudan. 
Emergence of the State of South Sudan
South Sudan is the product of a painful history of struggles for self-
determination characterised by protracted wars while it was still 
territorially an integral part of Sudan. The first civil war in Sudan that 
started at independence from Britain in 1956 pitted Anya-Anya rebels in 
southern Sudan, who were mostly African Christian and animist, against 
the Islamic and Arab-dominated, Khartoum-based GoS. The civil war 
ended in 1972 with the Addis Ababa Agreement which granted the south 
of Sudan political autonomy with a regional executive and legislature. 
The Agreement only lasted until 1983 when President Ja’afar Nimeiri 
abrogated on the agreement and continued the policies of Arabisation and 
Islamisation of the South (Lesch 2001:14). The discovery of oil, which is 
mostly located in the south of Sudan, was a key factor in making the civil 
war intractable as it became the economic mainstay of the country and 
a source of self-aggrandisement of the Northern political elite. The CPA 
which ended the second civil war created a semi-autonomous territory of 
Southern Sudan with its own government, although the GoS maintained 
overall jurisdiction over the national territory. The CPA also stipulated 
a six-year transitional period after which the people of Southern Sudan 
would be given an opportunity to choose through a referendum whether to 
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unite with or secede from the Sudan. The overwhelming vote for secession 
in January 2011 led to the independence and creation of the Republic of 
South Sudan on 9 July 2011, six months later. 
The people of South Sudan were subjected to a long history of imposed 
racialised and religious identity constructs that predates the colonial era. 
These were sustained during colonialism and mobilised by successive 
post-independence Northern governments of the Sudan and consequently 
underpinned the political, economic and social marginalisation of 
southerners (Deng 1995). Although the leader of SPLM/A, the late John 
Garang, originally had a vision of a united ‘democratic’ Sudan, it was 
more than obvious that the currents would f low undeterred towards a 
total political disengagement from the North. The 98.83% vote for self-
determination (Southern Sudan Referendum Commission 2011) was a 
polemical expression of the aspirations of southerners.
That said, it is important to note that the very racialised identities of the 
North-South axis in Sudan that were politically constructed to produce 
historical forms of power (Idris 2001) have now transmuted and reproduced 
themselves in the independent South Sudan as constructs of ethnic 
supremacy tied to post-independence entitlements. Whilst the Dinka 
and Nuer-dominated SPLA led the struggle against the North, the two 
ethnic groups split in 1991 into rival factions under John Garang (Dinka) 
and Riek Machar (Nuer) respectively during the civil war. The internal 
conf lict between the Dinka and Nuer elites was mainly inf luenced by the 
quest for political-military leadership of the southern course (Madut and 
Hutchinson 1999:127–128). This was also underpinned by competition for 
economic resources which resulted in the violence being directed against 
each other’s civilian population (Madut and Hutchinson 1999:128). 
Hitherto, the Dinka-Nuer dominance had carried a different ideological 
construction from the kind of dominance sought during the CPA 
transitional period and after secession. During the civil war, the two ethnic 
groups, which are the most populous in South Sudan, had not attained the 
objective of transforming their relationship with the North in order to lay 
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claims for legitimating their dominance over southerners. Therefore, it was 
difficult to mobilise and sustain an ideology of ethnic supremacy and seek 
entitlements through use of state power. As Schomerus and Allen (2010: 
20–21) state, ‘political power is an extremely scarce and highly valuable 
resource, available only periodically under specific conditions. In Southern 
Sudan, the CPA Interim Period2 provided those conditions’.
The logic of indigenous, inferior southern identity which was formed by 
the North undergirded entitlements that excluded most southerners from 
governance. As we shall see below, this logic has now been reproduced by 
the southerners themselves through the agency of state-building. The CPA 
Interim Period as well as the secession offered beneficial conditions for the 
Dinka and Nuer to define a form of political settlement which justified 
their grip on political power and determined the accompanying socio-
economic entitlements. The state-building process that favoured formal 
institutional development sustained this mode of settlement.
The December 2013 conflict: A reminder of the hard 
road to state-building
The conf lict which started on the evening of Sunday 15 December 2013 
in South Sudan claimed thousands of lives and left over 1 500 000 people 
displaced. The violence began when the SPLM National Liberation Council 
was holding its meeting in Juba, the capital of South Sudan. Riek Machar, 
the leader of SPLM/A-IO, was sacked as Vice-President by President Salva 
Kiir in July 2013 in a cabinet purge. This purge was aimed at political rivals 
within the Government, thereby reviving the past violent factionalism that 
was evident during the North-South civil war (Fletcher 2013). 
According to a report by the International Crisis Group (ICG 2014), the 
dispute within the SPLM that led to the conf lict was primarily political. 
President Kiir declared an attempted coup d’état, a claim refuted by 
Machar, the SPLM-IO leader. However, communal mobilisation along 
ethnic lines led to appalling levels of brutality against civilians, including 
2 This refers to the CPA six-year transitional period.
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deliberate killings inside churches and hospitals. Whilst violence initially 
targeted Dinka and Nuer civilians, armed youth from different ethnic 
groups mobilised and responded to attacks in a widening circle of reprisal 
and revenge (ICG 2014:9). It is important to understand how the conf lict 
found the intensity to spread rapidly in a matter of days to civilian spheres. 
The violence found a fertile seedbed of volatile space of weak social capital 
ready to be exploited by the political elite.
At independence on 9 July 2011 the new citizenry was plunged into a difficult 
road of state-building where everything was either a ‘need or necessity’ 
(Gerenge 2014:24). Basic infrastructure to deliver essential public services 
in South Sudan was minimal at best, compared to most African states at 
independence in the past century. This condition is well captured by the 
South Sudan Fragility Assessment Report (GoSS 2012:1) which states that:
Due to the legacy of conflict and neglect, socio-economic devel opment in 
South Sudan starts from a very low base, despite a nominally high income 
derived from oil. In the absence of basic infrastructure and limited delivery 
capacity, most people remain cut off from access to social services. Many 
health, education and food security indicators remain close to crisis levels. 
Government capacity to deliver services only begins to form, and is limited 
by fiscal austerity following a temporary shutdown of oil production.
Thus, the December conf lict unfolded on the back of persistent social 
and economic demands and war fatigue. The post-secession euphoria in 
South Sudan dissipated fast in the face of persisting social and economic 
challenges accentuated by growing insecurity that ran deep within South 
Sudan (Stevenson 2011). Indeed, war-like tendencies had already begun to 
re-emerge in the face of challenging social and economic conditions in the 
transitional period. Laudati (2011:20–23) gives a nuanced and empirically-
informed insight on the extent to which in Jonglei, the largest and most 
populous of South Sudan’s ten states, the Dinkas have obscured the ethnic 
supremacy construct through the formation of a victim narrative over 
the more widely cited liberator narrative, which legitimises greater Dinka 
control over non-Dinka regions. It is alleged that Dinka portray themselves 
97
South Sudan’s December 2013 conflict
as peace-loving and the victims of aggression from other communities 
whom they label as aggressive. This construct is sustained by the Dinka 
diaspora with greater access to the media and as well as the government 
machinery. It is alleged that the Dinka diaspora have tended to gloss over 
evidence of Dinka-perpetrated atrocities against other communities. Yet, 
as of October 2012, Jonglei accounted for 74 per cent of 1 326 conf lict-
related deaths during the year (GoSS 2012:3).
It is worth noting that a similarly disguised victim-liberator narrative has 
also been crafted by the Nuer and played a significant role of mobilisation 
of Nuer civilians in internally displaced camps as a result of the December 
conf lict. The displacement of Nuer populations led to mobilisation of the 
Nuer White Army as a response to the perception that President Kiir is 
consolidating a ‘Dinka dominated’ Government (South Sudan Protection 
Cluster 2014).
That said, the reality is that the current state-building approach which 
builds on institutions that existed during the CPA transitional period, in 
fact, propagates the liberator narratives of both Dinka and Nuer. On one 
hand, this approach nominally emphasises a democratic track focused 
on seeking to build strong decentralised state institutions that seek to 
redress the legacy of marginalisation by the North (Schomerus and Allen 
2010). However, on the other hand, this approach has produced counter-
productive results. The decentralised institutions lack accountability at 
the local level and have served to create tribal fiefdoms, which become 
incubators of violence themselves (Schomerus and Allen 2010). On the 
back of high levels of poverty, merit-based recruitment in the public 
administration in South Sudan has been superseded by nepotism based 
on the grounds of those who fought for peace most (African Development 
Bank 2011) – a claim that is palatable to the Dinka and Nuer but inimical to 
the democratic track of state-building that promotes inclusive governance. 
This system uses government salaries for little or no work performed, 
which further drains government resources that otherwise might be used 
for public service delivery (African Development Bank 2011:22).
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The formal institutions of the state meant to distribute public goods and 
services to the people have been captured and have become detrimental to 
the informal norms of cooperation by sowing discord among communities. 
The result of state capture in South Sudan is that ‘the underlying ethnic 
and regional cleavages continue to provide a motive for violence. The actors 
who mobilise these grievances and have the organisational, financial and 
other capacities to organise and direct violence (the means); and trigger 
points that provide the opportunity for conf lict actors to set violence into 
motion’ (African Development Bank 2011:21). 
The Dinka-Nuer ethnicised liberator narrative has therefore served to 
strengthen bonding social capital3 but depleted the bridging social capital 
among communities. This has resulted in creating weak structural 
relationships in society which impede the generation of cooperative norms 
by cultivating a wider radius of trust beyond a particular ethnic group. 
The December 2013 violent conf lict was, thus, poised to rapidly escalate 
through mobilisation along the existing structural fault-lines despite the 
fall-out between President Kiir and former Vice-President Machar a few 
months earlier. 
Quest for ‘peace’ or post-secession dividends
The politics of patronage has to be understood within the extant tensions in 
South Sudanese society which are a result of the clamour for peace or post-
secession dividends. The quest for dividends has reproduced conf licting 
visions of the kind of political settlement that should be forged in South 
Sudan. The local Dinka and Nuer people are perceived to have relatively easier 
access to public goods through their patrons in the government or within 
the SPLA, whilst the rest of society have simpler expectations of a fair share 
from the state. For instance, Pinaud (2014:208) provides an example of how 
patronage has been built on kinship networks in state institutions in South 
Sudan. She notes that the military elite dominated by Dinka and Nuer, for 
3 This does not mean that there are no intra-Dinka and Nuer divisions. In fact, there are 
members of these communities who disagree with the constructed supremacy of these 
tribes (see ICG 2014).
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instance, used the affirmative action criteria of the post-CPA constitution, 
which states that at least 25 percent of the organisation must be female, to 
appoint the wives of commanders and of lower-stratum intermediaries to 
important army, police, and government positions. De Waal (2014) argues 
that the GoSS allowed this kind of patronage to exist in order to maintain 
cohesion within the SPLM/A. As in other post-conf lict settings, ensuring 
cohesion in the army through maintaining loyalty is crucial, particularly, 
because the national army is often composed of former armed rebel 
groups who undergo a process of transformation through disarmament, 
demobilisation and reintegration. However, the process of deconstructing 
previous loyalties to former rebel leaders is complex and often replete with 
unintended consequences. Indeed, the effort to maintain loyalty of the 
army through patronage in South Sudan has proven counter-productive, as 
clearly shown by the eruption of the December conf lict within the ranks of 
the SPLM/A and also within a volatile civilian space. 
It is known that the Dinka and Nuer played a prominent role during the 
civil war against the North, but ordinary citizens in South Sudan also lay 
rightful claims that they participated in and were affected by the liberation 
war and have an inalienable entitlement to the post-civil war dividends 
(South Sudan News Agency 2014). In a country with over sixty ethnic 
groups, many non-Dinka and non-Nuer civilians lament that they also lost 
their property and members of their families during the civil war with the 
North, and therefore are rightfully entitled to a fair share of government 
jobs and security (South Sudan News Agency 2014). 
Whilst the above shared historical experience should guide the population 
towards common aspirations, post-CPA realities show how ethnic 
supremacy has redefined social order in local communities. An illustrative 
example of the detrimental quest for entitlement is vividly illuminated 
by a leader of a local non-governmental organisation in Western Bahr eh 
Ghazal, South Sudan who commented in 2010 that:
You know, our Dinka, during the war, there was nothing. After CPA, they 
start fighting. I went to Mundri, there was a big farm. And Dinka of Bor 
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took their cattle there. They ate everything. But the payam4 administrator 
said we have no choice. Dinka says it belongs to them and they have a gun. 
I went to Torit and I heard that there is now a payam in Nimule called Bor 
[Dinka town and Garang’s home] payam… For me I am thinking that they 
are thinking this Southern Sudan belongs to them. So they want to cover all 
the small tribes (Schomerus and Allen 2010:20).
The above predicament is a manifestation of communities at odds with 
each other, where informal norms of cooperation are either minimal 
or non-existent and public institutions are incapable of regulating 
relationships among citizens. It has constrained the generation of bridging 
social capital across ethnic groups and communities in South Sudan, which 
is a consequence of the state-building process in South Sudan. 
The depletion of social capital can be understood by looking at how 
cooperative informal norms among communities prevailed before periods 
of violent inter-communal conf licts. According to Deng (2010:242), 
farming was a collective endeavour in communities in South Sudan. This 
traditional practice involves a regular system, whereby each household 
within the community invites members of the community to perform a 
certain activity on its farm; in return, the inviting household will provide 
food and local beer.
Despite intermittent conf licts that existed during the CPA six-year 
transitional period, the massive rallying for secession (with a 98.83% vote) 
indicates that there was still a dense stock of social capital that could be 
explored and nurtured by defining a common vision of political settlement. 
Whilst there is no accepted method of measuring social capital, the level 
of internal group cohesiveness and action in relation to outsiders can be a 
critical qualitative measurement of social capital (Fukuyama 2001:13). The 
overwhelming vote by the southerners to secede from the North therefore 
indicated the level of spontaneous cohesion where the people acted in 
collective resolve towards a common goal. It is this instantiated informal 
4 Payam is the nomenclature of the local administrative unit in South Sudan.
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norm that promoted the cooperation towards secession that was further 
depleted rather than nurtured by the state-building process in South Sudan.
Social capital: A recourse for peace in South Sudan
As noted earlier, alongside the main conf lict pitting the GoS against the 
SPLM-IO, other localised violent conf licts also persisted in communities. 
The grievances tend to be related to resource competition as well as 
perceptions of economic and political marginalisation. It has also been 
noted that current state-building challenges facing South Sudan have led to 
the further breakdown of state capacity to respond to citizens’ needs while 
citizens’ expectations of the state remain high. Under these circumstances, 
the quest for a state that is responsive to the needs of the people as an 
entitlement for the hard-won independence of South Sudan is likely to 
continue to strain the already weak institutions.
Whilst the peace accord to end the December 2013 conf lict has been 
signed, sustainable peace through the current state-building trajectory 
cannot be realised through formal institutional engineering alone. Indeed, 
there is already a realisation in the state-building and conf lict management 
literature that there are ‘limits of constitutional engineering alone’ in 
achieving sustainable peace after conf lict (Wolff 2011). As stipulated in 
the peace accord, institutional arrangements that promote consociational 
governance have importance in promoting inclusive governance in divided 
countries (Wolff 2011), and would therefore, arguably, be instrumental in 
contributing to minimising the Dinka and Nuer hegemony in governance 
in South Sudan. However, more is needed in the state-building process than 
inclusive governance, whether through power-sharing or another form of 
institutional arrangement that ensures the different segments of society 
are genuinely represented in political institutions. That said, one of the 
main challenges encountered in fragile states is that this type of legitimacy 
can be particularly difficult to achieve, given these states’ weak governance 
structures, which makes it difficult for them to build their legitimacy solely 
on the basis of their performance (Menocal and Fritz 2007).
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That is, the re-negotiation of the relationship between the state and society 
in South Sudan must take cognisance of the logic that defines the current 
existing mode of political settlement – which is tied to the claims for 
dividends of peace or post-secession. For the state to grow its capacity in 
order to penetrate social life (Mann 1984), the people’s expectations of the 
state must be transformed in South Sudan. Put differently, there is need 
for a gradual scaling down of expectations that the state of South Sudan 
is capable of meeting all demands, particularly social and economic. This 
does not imply the state ‘exiting’ society, but the state transforming its 
ideological technique by reshaping its relationship with the society. 
Generally, in the face of the significant social, economic and political 
problems in the country the effects of state-building in South Sudan will 
not be easily palpable in the short or medium-term. This is in spite of the 
massive exogenous political, military and humanitarian support mobilised 
mainly through the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) 
and other international initiatives. Indeed, experience has shown that 
external intervention alone cannot provide lasting solutions to security 
and governance dilemmas within a society (Sawyer 2005).
On the back of persistent social and economic needs in South Sudan, little 
investment has been directed at generating informal norms of cooperation 
among communities. The generation of such norms of cooperation can be 
achieved through developing public policies that encourage the formation 
of informal voluntary associational groups that specifically target collective 
actions for social and economic gains. Given that most of the conf licts are 
tied to the competition for post-secession dividends, understanding the 
potential sources of social capital in the South Sudanese society offers 
insights for building the self-governing capabilities of communities in 
South Sudan. Understanding how people craft or adapt institutions of 
collective action can serve as a critical lens for developing their capacities 
for self-governance, which can be extended to embrace situations of 
governance failure and violent conf lict where survival is at stake (Sawyer 
2005).
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If the conf lict in South Sudan is all about the politics of marginalisation, as 
viewed by some, then a critique of this view would be that conf lict resulting 
from exclusion, inequality, and indignity does not in itself necessarily 
lead to the eruption of widespread hostilities (Colletta and Cullen 2000). 
Indeed, the tolerance and coping capacities of the poor and marginalised 
are legend and manifold (Colletta and Cullen 2000). Social capital has 
been instrumental in mobilising communities to cope with their own 
social, security and economic dilemmas in many contexts. In effect, social 
capital has contributed to the reformation of state-society relationships 
and management of conf licts. 
Generally, it is important to note that states do not have many obvious 
levers for generating social capital (Fukuyama 2000). Social capital is 
frequently a by-product of religion, tradition, shared historical experience, 
and other factors that lie outside the control of government (Fukuyama 
2001). Indeed, experience from countries such as Uganda suggests that a 
better understanding of how the synergy between social capital and public 
policy can be strengthened is crucial to minimise conf licts over scarce 
natural resources (Sanginga et al. 2007). In the South-western highlands 
of Uganda, a combination of voluntary associations ranging from credit 
and savings groups, farming groups, to church-based groups, and the 
development of by-laws, collectively contributed to managing conf licts 
(Sanginga et al. 2007). Since a considerable proportion of members of a 
particular social group belonged to several other self-help groups, the cost 
of making transactions was reduced as trust was built among the people 
and it became easier for parties to a conf lict to resolve it through a win-win 
outcome (Sanginga et al. 2007). From this experience it can be deduced that 
multiple memberships which transcended ‘tribal’ borders created a dense 
network of shared interests among individuals, which in effect generated 
informal norms of cooperation based on embedded trust. 
Stemming from the above, it can be noted that social capital has the 
capacity to restructure relationships to transcend specific groups 
(ethnic, religious or otherwise), trigger cooperative predispositions of 
individuals and engender peaceful resolution of conf licts when they 
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arise. All these cooperative engagements in Uganda were made possible 
through local policies that encouraged the formation of informal groups. 
For example, Sanginga et al. (2007) state that in order to buttress the 
structured resolution of conf licts through informal group networks, the 
local government developed by-laws that facilitated recourse to Local 
Councils by individuals in cases where there were overlapping conf licts 
that therefore perceivably required external adjudication. They also state 
that the success of this synergy between social capital and public policy 
is premised on complementarity and embeddedness: mutually supportive 
relations between local government and local communities, and the 
nature and extent of the ties connecting people, communities and public 
institutions. The Ugandan case above does not demonstrate state failure 
but rather limited state capacity to regulate conf licts, a situation remedied 
through recourse to social capital. 
However, a different experience, in Liberia during the civil war, 
demonstrates social capital as being useful for the survival of individuals 
in situations of total governance failure, and demonstrates how it further 
forms an important building block in the reconstruction of post-conf lict 
governance arrangements. According to Sawyer (2005), communities 
forged cooperative engagements with each other as a ‘coping’ mechanism 
against state-sponsored violence. Consequently, in the ensuing post-
conf lict reconstruction period, these already forged informal structural 
relationships among communities became critical in the mobilisation of 
joint efforts for local development such as building schools. 
The resilience to conf licts in society undergirded by social capital is therefore 
structurally situated in a dense network of overlapping memberships that 
create broad trust that transcends specific ‘group borders’. These dense 
informal norms of cooperation and reciprocity reproduced through 
pursuit of collective goals may be important in transforming the volatility 
of the public space that is easily exploited to mobilise the society through 
violence. In South Sudan, this volatility of the public space can be diffused 
by diminishing the over-reliance on the already strained state as the ‘only’ 
105
South Sudan’s December 2013 conflict
means of realising social and economic ends and in effect helping to meet 
high expectations for ‘peace’ or post-secession dividends. 
Thus, it is necessary to revisit the existing strategy for state-building in 
South Sudan. Whilst the current process of ‘institutional engineering’ 
needs to be sustained to ensure stronger accountability mechanisms 
that reduce patronage in governance, the ideological deconstruction of 
an approach that is hinged on ethnic supremacy tied to independence 
dividends is crucial to redefine the mode of political settlement for the 
state. Arguably, these efforts are only sustainable if other ‘informal 
institutional arrangements’ are nurtured to offer complementarity rather 
than supplant the legitimacy of the state to monopolise the use of force 
within its territory. Thus, conscious efforts to generate stocks of social 
capital as a self-regulatory governance system of conf lict management 
among and across communities are suggested to buttress broader state-
building mechanisms and secure sustainable peace in South Sudan.
Conclusion
This article has demonstrated that the December 2013 conf lict is not only 
about the elitist struggle for power between President Salva Kiir and Riek 
Machar, the former Vice-President, both representing the Dinka-Nuer 
ethnic axis of the conf lict respectively. It is important to transcend this 
ethnic conundrum by seeking to understand how the conf lict found so 
volatile a seedbed in the public space, propelling it to rapidly escalate 
to unimaginable scale in the civilian community. The triggers of the 
December 2013 conf lict in South Sudan were indeed bound to benefit 
from such a volatile space. The conf lict found a ground defined by weak 
bridging social capital that was depleted through a state-building process 
that favoured formal institutional engineering to the detriment of informal 
norms of cooperation based on horizontal relationships. The logic of racial 
and religious superiority which undergirded the civil war against the 
North has been reproduced within the new state of South Sudan. Whilst 
the southerners were conceived as inferior, those who were at the forefront 
in the liberation struggle have developed the same kind of supremacy 
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narrative that they resented while at war with the North. The post-CPA era 
offered beneficial conditions for the Dinka and Nuer to define a form of 
political dominance and accompanying socio-economic entitlements. Yet, 
on the other hand, ordinary South Sudanese citizens lay rightful claims 
to peace or post-secession dividends, which collectively has placed a high 
demand on the weak state. The divergent conception of expectations of the 
state has generated a conf licting vision of the state-society relationship in 
South Sudan. 
By attempting to construct a nexus between state-building and social 
capital, this article has demonstrated that the success of state-building 
does not depend on formal institutional engineering alone but requires 
the buttressing of informal institutions as well. It is suggested that in 
order to renegotiate the relationship between the state and society, social 
capital should be incorporated for the peaceful management of conf licts 
by the state, which is under stress to deliver dividends for independence. 
In order to enhance the sustainability of the state, it is suggested that the 
current state-building strategy be revisited to integrate the fostering of 
social capital in order to contribute to the ‘development of self-governing 
capabilities’ of communities in South Sudan. This serves to buttress rather 
than supplant the state’s capacity to regulate conf licts.
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